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With the rapid growth in the number of Internet of Things
(IoT) devices with wireless communication capabilities, and
sensitive information collection capabilities, it is becoming
increasingly necessary to ensure that these devices com-
municate securely with only authorized devices. A major
requirement of this secure communication is to ensure that
both the devices share a secret, which can be used for secure
pairing and encrypted communication. Manually imparting
this secret to these devices becomes an unnecessary over-
head, especially when the device interaction is transient.
In this work, we empirically investigate the possibility of
using an out-of-band communication channel – vibration,
generated by a custom smartRing – to share a secret with
a compatible IoT device. Through a user study with 12 par-
ticipants we show that in the best case we can exchange
85.9% messages successfully. Our technique demonstrates
the possibility of sharing messages accurately, quickly and
securely as compared to several existing techniques.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Human-centered computing → Ubiquitous and mo-
bile computing; Mobile devices; • Security and privacy;
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1 INTRODUCTION
Over the last few years, there has been a tremendous growth
in the number of deployed IoT devices with sensing and data
transmitting capability – e.g., a wearable Continuous Glu-
cose Monitors (CGM) can collect a user’s blood-glucose level
and wirelessly transfer the information to an individual’s
personal device such as a smartphone or a smartwatch or any
other device that represents the user. Data acquired by these
devices can sometimes reveal sensitive information. For ex-
ample, blood glucose information can reveal an individual’s
dietary pattern. Furthermore, some IoT devices (e.g., a smart
blood pressure monitor or a body-weight scale) can exist in
a home and can be shared by members of a household. A
user’s interaction with such devices can be short-lived and
does not justify permanent pairing between the IoT device
and each user’s personal device. Thus, it is important for
these data-transmitting IoT devices to know who is using
it, and for the personal device to know which IoT device is
currently being used. To ensure that the IoT device knows
who is using it, the personal device should be able to share
a secret message with the IoT device. The devices can then
use this secret message to bootstrap a secure channel that
they can use to exchange encrypted information. This secret
sharing process should be unobtrusive to the user.
A straightforward solution to the problem is to allow an in-
dividual to explicitly pair each IoT device with the legitimate
personal device using a PIN code or similar technique. This
manual key-exchange process, however, can be cumbersome
for the individual, especially when the number of devices an
individual interacts with is large and the interaction with
these devices is short-lived. For example, when an health-
care practitioner needs to access real-time data from every
visiting patient’s CGM.
To make this temporary key exchange convenient, yet
secure, we seek an answer for the question – how can a smart
IoT device quickly, securely and unobtrusively receive a secret
from the individual who is interacting with it? Although there
are various styles in which an individual can interact with a
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Figure 1: Operation of effortless out-of-band pairing using smartRing: (a) an individual picks a smartThing wearing a smart-
Ring; (b) the ring automatically discovers the smartThing and shares a secret through the vibratory channel; (c) the secret is
used to bootstrap a secure wireless connection between the smartThing and athe individual’s personal device.
device, in this work we focus on the physical interaction of
picking up and holding a device with the intention of using
the device in its expected usage style.
To answer the question, in this paper we evaluate the pos-
sibility of using an out-of-band communication channel –
vibration – generated by a smartRing to allow an individual’s
device to share a secret with a smart IoT object, a.k.a. smart-
Thing. This secret obtained by the smartThing can eventually
be used to bootstrap a secure session between the smart thing
and the individual’s personal device over an in-band wireless
channel. We present the operation of such a system in Fig-
ure 1. The advantage of using vibration as out-of-band chan-
nel is the nature of attenuation in vibration signals: the signal
decays as the distance from the vibration source increases.
This attenuation (lossy property) makes it difficult for a dis-
tant adversary to gather information transferred through
vibration. Since an accelerometer chip is rather inexpensive
and many smartThings are equipped with an accelerometer,
we use the smartThing’s accelerometer to capture the secret
transmitted through vibration.
An important usability requirement for such a system is
to ensure that the key exchange is quick and it does not dis-
turb the individual’s natural interactions, i.e., the individual
does not have to perform explicit additional actions such as
bringing a vibrating smartphone in contact with the smart-
Thing. It is intuitive that a finger-based vibration source,
which is usually in close proximity to a handheld object,
could be used for exchanging the secret. With the increasing
interest in smart jewelry, especially smartRings (e.g., Motiv
Ring [4]), and their constantly improving battery-life, they
become an obvious candidate for the secret-sharing source.
The shared secret can, in-turn, support a secure in-band
wireless communication channel between the smartThing
and a personal device. This entire process of discovering
and securely connecting an individual’s trusted device with
the smartThing will be seamless to the individual as it will
require no additional interaction from the individual.
Although researchers have previously explored the possi-
bility of in-band information exchange through vibration [2,
Figure 2: System overview of smartRing
6] or out-of-band exchange [3], as compared to prior work,
our system is either faster or can work in naturalistic setting.
2 SYSTEM OVERVIEW
Figure 2 pictorially depicts the working of the envisioned
system. The system consists of a smartThing [T ] and a smart-
Ring [R]. [T ] has a pick detection module. This module puts
the components of [T ] into a low-power sleep mode, un-
til [T ] is picked up by an individual. When [T ] detects that
it is being picked up, its BLE module starts advertising its
presence. Once a user has picked up [T ], the user presses
a button on the [R] that the user is wearing. To make the
process less obtrusive, in future, we could consider using a
pick-up detection technique on [R] (e.g., as described in [5])
to initiate the key exchange. In this work, we assume that
the aforementioned steps already exist. We work towards
implementing the subsequent steps. At this point, [R] turns
on the BLE scanner to listen for the presence of a smart-
Thing. [R] identifies a smartThing by its name. On receiving
an advertisement from [T ], [R] generates a random n bit
message, K . This n-bit message is transmitted by [R] in the
form of vibrations. We currently use Manchester Encoding
scheme for the transmission of the signal. When [T ] detects
the expected preamble for a vibration pattern, it extracts
the subsequent n bits. Several time domain features are used
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(a) The smartRing (b) The smartThing
Figure 3: Prototype of the smartRing and smartThing board
made using off-the-shelf boards for evaluation purpose
to extract the secret message. [T ] also updates its BLE ad-
vertisement details to inform the smartRing that it is the
smartThing which has received the vibration message. Fi-
nally to ensure that the secret has been exchanged properly,
[R] and [T ] perform a key reconciliation step and Hamming
error correcting code for correcting up to 4 ambiguous bits.
This step ensures that [T ] has received the correct message
and can use it to transmit its identity and other data.
Implementation
Figure 3 shows the prototype smartRing and smartThing. We
used development boards available in the TinyCircuits store1
to assemble these prototypes. The current prototypes are
only for experimental and evaluation purpose; they would be
much smaller and suitably sized if engineered as a product.
The smartRing: The smartRing consists of two coin type
Eccentric Rotating Mass (ERM) vibration motors, a slightly
modified Arduino Uno board with Atmega328P MCU, and a
board with STMicroelectronics’ BLE chipset.
The smartThing: The smartThing consists of the same pro-
cessor as the smartRing. The processor has a USB connector
stacked onto it for transferring the accelerometer data to a
computer. For RF communication, the smartThing uses the
STMicroelectronics’ BLE chipset. Lastly, the smartThing is
connected to an external 3-axis accelerometer (MPU-6050,
sampling at 500Hz) for collecting the acceleration data.
Data Collection
We attached the smartThing module to a hard plastic tum-
bler. The tumbler represents a hypothetical smartThing. We
collected two sets of data for this study: a controlled study
set, where we taped the smartRing to the smartThing and
collected data, and a user study where we recruited 12 par-
ticipants and instructed them to wear the ring prototype and
pick up the smartThing.
For the controlled study, we attached the ring directly
to the tumbler, 4 cm below the smartThing’s accelerometer.
1https://tinycircuits.com/
(a) Preamble Success Rate (b) Bit Success Rate
Figure 4: Performance of the system in the controlled study
The smartRing transmitted 10 randomly chosen unique mes-
sages, each of length 64 bits+8 bits preamble. The smartRing
transmitted each message at bit rates of {8.3, 10, 12.5, 16.7,
25} bits per second (bps). For every bit rate, the smartRing
transmitted each message 5 times. Thus in total we evaluate
the performance of 250 messages of 72 bits and report the
performance.
For the user study, we recruited 12 participants (5 males,
7 females), aged between 18 to 30 years. To understand the
system’s performance, each participant performed several
distinct pick up gestures while holding the smartThing at
various positions. We randomly selected 3 messages for this
study. During every pick up gesture, the smartRing transmit-
ted one among the three messages at {8.3, 10, 12.5, 16.7, 25}
bps. Overall, 135 messages of 64 bits + 8 bits preamble were
collected from each participant.
3 EVALUATION
We next evaluate the possibility of exchanging a message
using vibration and effect of holding style on this exchange.
Possibility of Communicating through Vibration
To measure the reliability of sending a message from the
smartRing to the smartThing through vibrations, we used
the controlled study dataset.
The first step in obtaining the message is preamble detec-
tion. The preamble indicates the start of a message. Figure 4a
shows the preamble detection rate at various bit rates. From
the figure we can see that at 16.7 bps, we could successfully
detect the preamble in 92% messages and it reaches 100%
for 10 bps and 8.3 bps. It is intuitive that at higher bitrate,
the bit-error rate (ratio of incorrectly received bits to total
transmitted bits) will be higher. We found that at 25 bps, the
number of preambles detected correctly was less than 80%.
Although the bit-error rate in the preamble is much lower,
we cannot detect the start of a message without detecting the
preamble; the preamble-detection rate is the more relevant
metric. At 12.5 bps, the preamble detection rate is 96% and
the time required to transmit a 64-bit message is 5.12 sec-
onds. Since the preamble-detection rate is reasonably high,
while the time required for a 64-bit message transmission is
reasonable, we use 12.5 bps as the default bit rate.
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(a) Various hold-
ing positions (b) Variation ofMER at 12.5 bps
Figure 5: Effect of Holding Position on the BER andMER
Next, we evaluate the bit-success rate (BSR, the ratio of
bits successfully received to total transmitted bits), for all the
messages where the smartThing could detect the preamble.
The BSR for messages where the preamble was correctly
detected is presented in Figure 4b. We observe that at 12.5
bps, our system has a BSR of 97.5%, indicating that only
1.8 bits in a 64 bits message + 8 bits preamble were inter-
preted incorrectly. However, we observe that the bit error
is not uniformly distributed across the messages. The effec-
tive message-success rate (MSR, the number of messages
transferred successfully) at 12.5 bps after resolving disputed
bits and applying error correcting code is 88.3%, indicating
that the system could share a 64 bit secret in less than 6
seconds in over 88% instances. The time taken for smartRing
to transfer the 64 bit secret is similar to the time taken to
gesturally input a 7 digit PIN, as demonstrated by Ahmed et
al. [1], but requires no effort or action by the user.
Effect of Holding Position on Message Transmission
We next use the user study dataset to analyze the effect of
holding style on the Bit Error Rate (BER) and the Message
Error Rates (MER). Figure 5a indicates the 6 approximate
positions of the smartRing when the participants held the
tumbler. During the study, we noticed that for positions P1
to P4, normally the user’s palm and fingers wrapped around
the tumbler. For P5, the fingers were in contact with the
tumbler, while for P6, only the palm was in contact.
We evaluate the BER and MER for the 6 positions at vari-
ous bitrates. However, due to space constraints, we present
results for only a bitrate of 12.5 bps. To evaluate the BER
and MER, we only consider the messages whose preamble
was detected correctly. From the data we observe that for
P1 to P4, the BER varies between 2.21% (at P1) and 4.93% (at
P3), indicating that the system will perform well when the
smartRing is near the smartThing’s accelerometer.
Since the goal of the system is to share a secret from
smartRing to a smartThing, we next compute the MER of
the system for the 6 positions at 12.5 bps. Figure 5b presents
the percentage of messages with no bit mismatch, up to 4 bit
mismatch, or more than 4 bit mismatch (which includes all
messages with error in preamble detection). From the figure
we can see that for position P1, more than 85% messages had
4 or fewer than 4 erroneous bits and we could resolve them
using the error-correcting code. From the figure we can also
see that for positions where there is little contact between
smartRing and the smartThing (P5 and P6), the percentage
of messages with 5 or more erroneous bits is 36.1%. This
indicates that for achieving low MER, the ring should be in
contact with the smartThing. Although a user may need to
adjust her grip to attain good contact, this effort is still lower
than manually inputting a secret.
4 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this workwe demonstrate the possibility of using vibration
generated by a smartRing to share a secret with a smartThing.
Through a controlled study we show that it is possible to
share the secret reliably – with bit error rate of less than
2.5%. Additionally, through a user study we show that the
system can successfully exchange over 85% messages in the
best case. In future, we plan to evaluate the effect of bit rate
and type of material on the message success rates. We also
plan to evaluate various security threats (e.g., impersonation
attacks or denial-of-service attacks) on such a system.
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